Politically Sustainable Social Insurance by Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin





Current version: March 2007
Preliminary and Incomplete
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Private information underpins a basic social trade-oﬀ between incentives and inequality. Normative models of
dynamic incentive provision explore the optimal evolution of this trade-oﬀ. Many prescribe relentlessly increasing
levels of inequality. Indeed, under a variety of standard preference assumptions, an immiseration result obtains: a
privileged measure zero set of agents obtain all resources in the economy, while the rest converge to the minimal
possible utility level. The immiseration result makes the political viability of such optima doubtful.1 Surely, a
society could not realistically commit to implementing an allocation that consigns almost all agents to eventual
misery? Surely, the immiserated would resist?
This paper confronts these questions. We augment the well known normative model of Atkeson and Lucas
1Of course, similar issues occur in Ramsey models in which the government is restricted to using linear tax mechanisms and there
is usually a representative agent. The immiseration result gives them extra force in the current setting.
1(1992)2 with political arrangements for revising continuation allocations. To be politically sustainable an allo-
cation must be immune to such revision. Initially, we model these arrangements as a sequence of reduced form
continuous “political constraints” on the payoﬀs delivered to agents by an allocation. We call an allocation politi-
cally sustainable if it satisﬁes these constraints, along with resource and incentive-feasibility conditions. Later, we
turn to a class of fully speciﬁed political economy games that feature voting over mechanisms, we show that these
games deliver reduced form political constraints as equilibrium restrictions. Thus, political sustainability (with
respect to an appropriate sequence of political constraints) emerges as a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an
allocation to be an equilibrium one in these games.
To begin with we focus on Pareto optimal politically sustainable allocations. We show that such allocations
coincide with those chosen by a “virtual” planner who faces no political constraints, but who uses an endogenously
determined discounting scheme. In general, this scheme applies individualized, history dependent discount factors
to agents that weakly exceed the agents’ true discount factor. The virtual planner’s objective is derived from a
reorganization of the Lagrangian from the original politically constrained problem; her discount factors strictly
exceed those of the agents’ whenever the political constraints bind since such binding constraints elevate the shadow
value of future agent payouts. In this sense, she exhibits “excessive” social patience. We show that if immiserated
allocations (i.e. those that provide the minimal possible utility to almost all agents) violate the political constraints,
then these constraints bind inﬁnitely often in the Pareto problem. We give numerical examples in which these
constraints bind eventually and in which they bind always. In the latter case, the implied virtual planner uses
2The Atkeson-Lucas framework is simple and provides a well known benchmark. Our results can be extended to many other dynamic
private information environments.
2a constant discount factor in excess of the agent and, hence, the objective assumed in the normative analyses of
Farhi and Werning (2006).
The second part of the paper considers a class of political economy games with probabilistic voting. Following,
Atkeson and Lucas (1992), in each period t, a government allocates an aggregate quantity of resources Rt amongst
a population of long-lived agents. These agents experience privately observed taste shocks that aﬀect their desire
to consume and against which they would like to obtain insurance. To provide such insurance, the government
must induce them to reveal information about their shocks. It can do this by implementing a sequence of social
mechanisms. This sequence rewards agents who reveal a low current desire for consumption with higher future
utility and penalizes those who reveal a high current desire with reduced future utility. Thus, future mechanisms are
used to elicit information in the present. The mechanism sequence implemented by the government is determined
by a process of electoral competition. In each period, two political parties with diﬀerent characteristics propose
mechanisms. Agents then vote over party-mechanism pairs. Following the literature on probabilistic voting, we
assume that agents have idiosyncratic and time varying biases towards one party or the other. These biases imply
that electoral outcomes are uncertain and that they are not solely determined by economic policy.3 The repeated
holding of elections precludes government commitment; a mechanism will only be adopted if it is in the interests of
agents to vote for it in the period of its adoption. As we have noted, future mechanisms play an essential role in the
provision of current insurance, but when future elections come such past beneﬁts will be ignored. Agents vote for
the party-mechanism pair that maximizes their current expected lifetime payoﬀ. The latter depends not only upon
3They also confer a technical advantage: under appropriate assumptions on bias distributions, they ensure that a mechanism’s
election-winning probability is continuous in the payout of the continuation allocation it induces.
3the outcome of the current election, but also on the reporting behavior of agents and the (self-fulﬁlling) beliefs
that agents hold about future policy. This dependence on agent behavior and beliefs can impose discipline on the
electoral process. Sequences of mechanisms that reward past information revelation and provide insurance can
be sustained by equilibrium reporting behavior that eﬀectively punishes the electorate for choosing an alternative
sequence.
In our baseline model, distributions over political biases are uniform - a standard assumption in the literature -
and political parties are operated by politicians who are concerned only with winning oﬃce in the current period.
We show that equilibrium allocations must be resource and incentive-feasible and must satisfy a political constraint
that requires they maintain a utilitarian payoﬀ above a constant reservation level. Pareto optimal equilibrium
allocations solve virtual planning problems with no political constraints and a common, though potentially time
varying discount factor. Our analysis of reduced form Pareto optimal politically sustainable allocations applies
- political constraints must bind inﬁnitely often. The virtual planner’s problem in this case coincides with that
considered by Sleet and Yeltekin (2006). The numerical analysis of that paper suggests that incentive-constraints
on agents impart a force for immiseration and a downward drift in the utilitarian payoﬀ, eventually the political
constraints bind and arrest this drift. If the initial distribution of Pareto weights is suﬃciently dispersed, then
political constraints bind in all periods and, as described above, the virtual planner’s criterion features a constant
discount factor in excess of the agents. In summary, Pareto optimal equilibria feature uncommitted, highly
impatient politicians making the same choices as a committed and, from the agents’ point of view, excessively
patient virtual planner. Despite (indeed because) politicians cannot commit, they behave as if they are more
concerned with the long run than agents.
4We consider various extensions. Incorporating incumbency advantages or politicians who care about winning
future as well as current elections leaves our results intact. Allowing more general (i.e. non-uniform) distribu-
tions over biases complicates the analysis, but does not change the basic message. In this case, Pareto optimal
equilibrium allocations solve virtual planning problems with individual, history-dependent discount factors. These
discount factors capture the endogenously evolving political inﬂuence of history-speciﬁc sub-populations of agents.
Assuming that politicians are rent-seeking rather than oﬃce-motivated also leaves the basic message unaltered.
Again we recover a political constraint on continuation agent payoﬀs as an equilibrium restriction and, hence, a
patient virtual planner. In this case, the political constraint binds in all periods regardless of the initial distribution
of Pareto weights.
Up to this point, the equilibria that we have studied satisfy sequential rationality restrictions: after each
history, the continuation strategies of all politicians and agents are optimal. Although, these equilibria avoid
the immiserating outcomes that characterize the limits of allocations chosen by committed utilitarian planners,
they can, nonetheless, deliver low (continuation) social payoﬀs. This suggests that a politician may attempt to
coordinate the future play of agents and politicians on to a new equilibrium with a higher payoﬀ. Potentially,
the politician can enhance her electoral prospects if she can persuade agents that her election will trigger such
coordination. In the context of our baseline political economy game, we consider equilibria that are robust to
such “political revisions” by introducing an equilibrium reﬁnement in the spirit of Pearce’s renegotiation-proofness
(Pearce, 1987). We show that outcome allocations induced by such politically revision-proof equilibria are those
chosen by a virtual planner with a unit discount factor, i.e. the virtual planner corresponds to the Rawlsian planner
of Phelan (2006). Political revision-proofness serves to further tighten equilibrium restrictions on continuation
5utilitarian payoﬀs; it translates into equilibria that implement the allocations that would be chosen by a highly
patient, committed planner even though, as before, politicians have very short term objectives.
1.1 Literature
The normative literature Atkeson and Lucas (1992) consider the optimal trade-oﬀ between incentives and
insurance in a normative model that assumes planner commitment and equal private and societal discounting. They
provide an immiseration result. Farhi and Werning (2006), Phelan (2006) and Sleet and Yeltekin (2007) drop the
equal discounting assumption, but retain planner commitment. They show that when the societal discount factor
exceeds the private one, the immiseration result is overturned. In contrast, we dispense with planner commitment
and suppose that allocations are determined by an uncommitted political process. By focussing on Pareto optimal
and politically provision proof equilibria, we recover a committed “virtual planner” who uses discount factors in
excess of the agents.
This link between planner problems and political economy models provides positive micro-political foundations
for the former. In the other direction, it indicates the relevance of methods used in solving normative problems
with patient planners for political economy games.
Political economy literature The literature on probabilistic voting is large; Banks and Duggan (2003) provide
a unifying treatment, Persson and Tabellini give a textbook overview. Recent contributors have extended these
models to dynamic macroeconomic settings. Examples include Azzimonti (2004) and Hassler et al (2005, 2006).
The focus of these papers is varied, but relative to us they restrict attention to simpler mechanisms and Markov
equilibria. On the other hand, they allow for features that are not present here, including capital accumulation,
6heterogeneous preferences over public goods and aggregate shocks.
Acemo˘ glu et al (2006) is closest to us in spirit. They provide a model in which resource-allocating mechanisms
are implemented by rent-seeking politicians.4 If a politician attempts to extract more current rents than her
strategy prescribes, she is dismissed and her future rents are eliminated. In this model, unlike ours, there is no
contemporaneous competition for oﬃce amongst politicians. Because political competition is weaker, allocations
featuring arbitrarily unequal distributions of utility are sustainable, provided they deliver suﬃcient rents to the
politician. Acemo˘ glu et al emphasize optimal equilibria in which political constraints bind in the short run, but
not in the limit; in contrast, we obtain political constraints that bind inﬁnitely often (i.e. in the limit, but
not, generally, in the short run). Our model features an immiserating politically unconstrained optimum and a
competitive political system. We conjecture that political constraints that distort intertemporal margins would
be a permanent, rather than a transitory phenomenon in other models that share these features
Finally, the current paper builds on Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) who, in the spirit of Ramsey models without
commitment, model the government as an uncommitted planner implementing a sequence of mechanisms.
2 An environment with commitment
A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents inhabit an economy. The population is initially partitioned into a measure
space (R,B,Ψ) of types w. For now, we will interpret w simply as device for distinguishing between sub-populations
of agents. In each period, agents receive a random taste shock θt ∈ Θ := {b θk}K
k=1. These shocks are i.i.d. across
4Acemo˘ glu et al do consider a partially benevolent politician. However, they then restrict the shock process to ensure that the
provision of incentives does not require too much inequality ex post.
7agents and time with distribution π.L e tθt := {θ1,...,θt} ∈ Θt denote a t-period history of shocks; let πt denote
the corresponding probability distribution. We assume that for all t and sets E ⊂ Θt, πt(E) gives the fraction of
agents with shock history in E.5
After each realized history θt, an agent receives an allocation of consumption and, hence, utility. In the sequel,
it will be convenient to describe allocations directly in terms of the stream of utility they provide rather than
stream of resources they use. Deﬁne an individual allocation to be a sequence of functions {ψt}∞
t=1, with for all t,
ψt : Θt → D ⊆ R and denote an agent’s payoﬀ from {ψt}∞
t=1 by
U({ψt}∞








where β ∈ (0,1) is the agent’s discount factor. For now we assume that D is bounded. Similarly, we deﬁne a
(population) allocation {ϕt}∞
t=1 to be a sequence of measurable functions with ϕt : R × Θt → D. A population
allocation speciﬁes the individual allocation obtained by each w-type agent: {ϕt(w,·)}∞
t=1. Let W denote the range
of U and A the set of population allocations.
Cost function Let C(u) denote the cost of delivering a utility amount u to an agent. We suppose the function
C : D → R+ satisﬁes the following.
Assumption 1 1) C : D → R+ is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function. It is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable on the interior of D;2 )limu→∞ C0(u)=∞.
Of course, C implies a standard utility function over consumption: v = C−1.
5In making this assumption, we rely on the construction of Sun (2006).
82.1 Feasible Allocations
We require that an allocation be resource and incentive-feasible. Formally, suppose that the economy possesses








Since shocks are privately observed by agents, allocations must provide agents with incentives to reveal them.
Let α = {αt}∞
t=1 denote a reporting strategy for the agents with, for each t, αt : Θt → Θ.L e tαt(θt) denote the
history of reports induced by α g i v e nt h es h o c kh i s t o r yθt. An allocation provides incentives for truthful reporting












Let Γ({Rt},Ψ) denote the set of resource and incentive-feasible allocations {ϕt}∞
t=1 satisfying (1) and (2).
2.2 Planning problem








for some measurable Pareto-Negishi weighting function γ : R → R+ with
R
γ(w)Ψ(dw)=1 .T h i si se s s e n t i a l l ya
primal version of the problem considered by Atkeson and Lucas (1992). For a large class of cost functions C (or
utility functions C−1), its solution satisﬁes an agent immiseration property. Denoting a solution to (3) by {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1,
this property can be stated as: for Ψ-a.e. w, π∞-a.e. θ∞, limt→∞ U({ϕ∗
t+s(w,θt,·)}∞
s=1) exists and equals E[θ]infD.








3 Political constraints and patient virtual planners
A politically constrained Pareto problem We now augment the Pareto problem (3) with a sequence of
political constraints. These constraints capture restrictions on continuation allocations that are necessary to
ensure that the allocation is not revised or altered by a benevolent planner or by voters in an election. For the
moment, we simply state these constraints and explore their implications. Later we show that they emerge as
equilibrium restrictions in a variety of political economy models.
Let ht =( w,θt−1) denote an agent’s t-period individual history; this history includes the agent’s type along
w i t hi t ss h o c k su pt od a t et − 1.L e tQt be the probability measure for t-period histories induced by Ψ and πt.
Given a population allocation {ϕt}∞
t=1, we denote the implied individual continuation allocation after history ht
by {ϕt+r−1|ht}∞
r=1.D e ﬁne Ut = {u | u : R × Θt−1 → W, u measurable}, a convex subset of L∞(Qt);l e tZ be
a bounded subset of R.W e c a l l Zt : Ut → Z and X :[ 0 ,R] → R political viability functions and say that an
allocation {ϕt}∞









In the diﬀerent political economy games we consider below, Zt is variously, the probability that a continuation
allocation and, hence, a political party will win an election and the (negative) of the expected political rents
attainable from a political defection. In a model with a benevolent planner, it is the utilitarian payoﬀ and, hence,
10captures the planner’s commitment to the allocation. In some of the games described below X is present, in others
not. When it is present it describes the rents extracted by a political party. We assume the following.
Assumption 2 (Z1) For all t, Zt is Fréchet diﬀerentiable. For u ∈ Ut its Fréchet derivative ∂Zt is of the form:
∂Zt(u;f)=hb zt(u),fi.
where hb zt(u),fi =
R
b zt(u)(w,θt−1)f(w,θt−1)πt−1(θt−1)Ψ(dw), f ∈ Ut and the functions {|b zt(·)(·)|} are uniformly
bounded by some z<∞.
Assumption 3 (Z2) For all t, Zt is concave.
Assumption 4 (Z3) For all t, Zt is increasing and for all u ∈ Ut and almost all w,θt−1, b zt(u)(w,θt−1) > 0.
Assumption 5 (X) X is non-decreasing, continuous, smooth and concave.
Assumption 6 (ZX) There exists an incentive-feasible allocation {ϕt}∞





It is often convenient to re-express the sequence of constraints (4) as a single constraint {{ϕt}∞
t=1|{Zt ◦ U +
X}∞
t=1({ϕt}∞







These assumptions are essentially technical, they imply that the set of politically sustainable allocations is convex,
has a non empty interior and is described by a smooth function. In applications, (3) is the most problematic, when
it does not hold results similar to below continue to hold, but with local Kuhn-Tucker arguments replacing the
global optimization arguments used. Assumption 4 captures the intuitive idea that if an allocation is politically
sustainable, then one that oﬀers more to everyone is also politically sustainable.









subject to (1), (2) and (4).
The virtual planner We now show transform (5) into the problem of a virtual planner who uses a perturbed
discounting scheme and who faces no political constraints. There are three steps. We ﬁrst obtain a Lagrangian and
show that under our assumptions, an allocation is an optimal politically sustainable one if and only if it attains
a saddle point of the Lagrangian. The second step replaces the Lagrangian with a “linearized” Lagrangian, the
third reconﬁgures the linearized Lagrangian to give an objective for a virtual planner.































t=1 ∈ L = {{μt} ∈ R∞
+ |(1−β)
P∞
t=1 βt−1μt < ∞} denotes a sequence of bounded, summable multipliers
on the political constraints. We have the following.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions (3) and (6) hold and let U∗ denote the optimal payoﬀ from (5). Then, there is
an element {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L such that:













t=1, i.e. for all
{μt}∞















t=1 ∈ L and {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ Γ(R,Ψ) satisfy (8), then {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the optimum in (5).
The proof of this and other results is contained in the appendix. It invokes an argument of Rustichini (1996)
to establish that the optimal multipliers are summable. Next, we “linearize” the Lagrangian.
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions (2), (3), (6) hold. Suppose that {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (5). Then
there is a pair of sequences {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L and {b z∗
t}∞
t=1, b z∗








































t=1 solves (9) for some {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L and {b z∗
t}∞
t=1, b z∗













Notice that the “linearized” Lagrangian L∗({ϕt}∞
t=1;{μ∗
t},{b z∗




t=1 ∈ L be a multiplier sequence and {b zt}∞
t=1 a function sequence with b zt : R×Θt−1 → R+.For all
w,d e ﬁne z1(w,θ0) by μ1b z1(w,θ0)=μ1z1(w,θ0)γ(w) and for all t>1, w, θt−1,d e ﬁne zt(w,θt−1) by μtb zt(w,θt−1)
= μtzt(w,θt−1)γ(w)
Qt−1



















We utilize the following lemma.






































Combining the Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, we obtain the following.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions (2)-(6) hold. Suppose that {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (5). Then there is a
pair of sequences {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L and {z∗
t}∞
t=1, z∗

































r(w,θr−1)) ≥ βt−1 and R∗






t=1 solves (10) for some {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L, {R∗
t}∞
t=1 with R∗





































Notice that the optimization problem (10) features no political constraints, they are absorbed into the objective
and resource constraints. This objective corresponds to that of a committed planner who uses a history-contingent
discounting scheme with discount factors β(1+μ∗
tz∗
t(w,θt−1)) that weakly exceed those of the agents. If the political
constraint binds in period t,t h e nμ∗
t > 0 and the discount factor of the virtual planner strictly exceeds that of the
agents. Relative to the agents, the virtual planner exhibits an excessive concern for the long run. In the special
case in which for all t, w and θt−1, μ∗
tz∗
t(w,θr−1)=( λ−β)/β, the virtual planner’s preferences coincide with those
assumed in Farhi and Werning (2006) or Sleet and Yeltekin (2006). More generally, the current model delivers a
virtual planner who uses a history-contingent discounting scheme. This scheme may be interpreted as capturing
the time varying and history-dependent political inﬂuence of agents.
153.1 Dynamic private information and the pattern of binding political constraints
At this point we have not established that the political constraints bind in any period. We now turn to this issue
and impose the additional assumption:
Assumption 7 For all t, Zt(Ut)+X(0) < 0,w h e r eUt ∈ U is such that for Qt-a.e. (w,θt−1),U t(w,θt−1)=
E[θ]infD.
Assumption 7 implies that an allocation that pays out the entire resource bundle to agents and assigns the
minimal possible utility to almost all agents at some date t is not politically sustainable. The political constraints
that emerge as equilibrium conditions in our later political economy games satisfy this condition. Now, it follows
from the existing normative literature (e.g. Atkeson and Lucas, 1992) that if the political constraints did not bind
after some date T, then the continuation allocation would converge to an immiserated one (i.e. for Ψ-a.e. w,
π∞-a.e. θ∞, limt→∞ U({ϕ∗
t+s(w,θt,·)}∞
s=1)=E[θ]infD). The continuity of each Zt and Assumption 7 then imply
that this continuation allocation violates the political constraints. Hence, there can be no such date T and the
political constraints must bind inﬁnitely often. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 7 hold. Then the political constraints in (5) bind inﬁnitely often, i.e. for all T,
there is a t>T such that these constraints bind and the corresponding optimal multiplier μ∗
t is greater than zero.
An immediate implication of the previous propositions is that under their respective assumptions, the discount
factor of the virtual planner exceeds that of the agents inﬁnitely often. The result stops short of saying that
the political constraints “bind asymptotically”, i.e. limsupμ∗
t > 0. However, we conjecture that this is the case.
16Numerical examples suggest that the distribution of utilities becomes more dispersed as the multipliers μ∗
t decline
and that if these numbers are persistently small, then the resulting inequality is politically unsustainable.









≥ 0. Our political constraints set augment theirs with an
(increasing) Zt function and set χ =0 . It is the former diﬀerence that is important, since in conjunction with
Assumption 7, it ensures that political constraints preclude allocations that deliver low utilities to most agents.
4 A political economy game with oﬃce-motivated politicians
4.1 Basic environment
We embed the basic environment of Section 2 into a political economy game. The game incorporates probabilistic
voting over political parties. As is typical in the probabilistic voting literature, we assume that agents have
heterogeneous and time varying biases towards a particular party. Although stylized, these biases capture the
idea that elections are not solely determined by economic policy platforms. They ensure that election outcomes
are uncertain and that election probabilities and, hence, the implied political constraints, are continuous in agent
payoﬀ functions. We start with the simplest formulation in which 1) political bias distributions are uniform, 2)
there are no incumbency advantages and 3) parties are operated by impatient, oﬃce-motivated politicians. We
then complicate the model by relaxing each of these assumptions.
174.1.1 Players
Politicians There are two political parties i ∈ {A,B}. In each period, politicians from the respective parties
propose political mechanisms that describe how resources will be allocated in that period. Agents vote over the
two proposed mechanisms and the election-winning mechanism is implemented. Politicians are oﬃce-motivated,






t is the probability that party i wins the election at date t and χ is the politicians discount factor. In
much of the paper we assume that χ =0 . The assumption that politicians are completely myopic only makes our
results starker. Later we consider the possibility that politicians are concerned with the expected rents that they
can extract if elected.
Agents Agents have the same preferences over allocations as before; we augment them with biases for one or
the other party. Suppose that the two political parties A and B are distinguished by ﬁxed characteristics that
are non-economic in nature and diﬃcult to change. We call these characteristics ideologies. Agent preferences
over ideologies are described by two families of random variables {ξ} and {δt}.T h e ﬁrst of these represents a
permanent and idiosyncratic shock to each agent’s relative preference for party B’s ideology, it is i.i.d. across
agents according to an atomless distribution with c.d.f. F. The second represents a common, time varying shock
to the population’s preference for party B’s ideology, it is i.i.d. across time according to an atomless distribution










t is a random variable that takes the value 1 if party B is in power in period t and 0 otherwise. An agent’s
total payoﬀ from an allocation {ϕt}∞










For now we make the following assumption on the distributions F and G. It is conventional in applied
probabilistic voting models. Later we relax it.




























The last part of the assumption rules out inconvenient boundary solutions by ensuring that within each history-
contingent sub-population there are some agents who will vote for either party no matter what and at the aggregate
level, there is a probability (possibly very small) that a party will win an election no matter what.6
4.1.2 The stage game
Mechanisms As before, the economy is endowed with R units of resources in each period. Political parties
propose schemes (or “political mechanisms”) for allocating these resources amongst agents; they compete in
elections with the mechanism of the election-winning party being implemented. At the beginning of period t ≥ 1,
6The second part of the assumption is not necessary for our ﬁrst model with oﬃce-motivated parties. It does simplify our second
model with rent-motivated parties.
19each agent is publicly identiﬁed by an index w ∈ R and a history of past messages mt−1 ∈ Mt−1.Am e c h a n i s m
proposal from party i is a pair Si
t =( Mi
t,ϕ i
t), i ∈ {A,B}.T h eﬁrst piece of the mechanism is a ﬁnite message space
that agents use to communicate with the planner, the second is a utility allocation function ϕi
t : R×Mt−1×Mi
t → D
that describes how utility will be awarded to agents contingent on their index and message history inclusive of
current message that they send. We suppose that ϕi
t is appropriately measurable.
Remark: We allow for a fairly rich collection of mechanisms, much richer than is typically permitted in the
probabilistic voting-political economy literature. In principal, these mechanisms can be used to implement history
dependent allocations that provide future rewards and penalties for current behavior and, more speciﬁcally, they
can be used to implement the optimal allocation of a committed utilitarian planner.
Timing The ensuing stage game consists of three sub-periods. In the ﬁrst, politicians propose mechanisms. In
the second the δ political preference shock is realized and agents vote over mechanisms. In the third sub-period, the
election-winning mechanism is executed. Agents receive their taste shocks, they choose a probability distribution
over the current message space and draw a message from it. They transmit this message to the government and
receive the utility award implied by the election-winning utility allocation function.
4.1.3 Histories and strategies
We place some restrictions on strategies at the outset to rule out especially implausible equilibria. In particular, we
assume that no player conditions her behavior on either past election-loosing mechanisms or the political identity
20of past election winners.7 This assumption precludes strategies that would eﬀectively punish the economy for
failing to elect a particular party even if that party makes a very undesirable mechanism proposal. However, it
still allows for considerable history dependence of equilibria and is much weaker than a Markov restriction.
Policy strategies We deﬁne an aggregate history Ht, t ≥ 2, to be a sequence {Mr,ϕ r}t−1
r=1 of past election-
winning mechanisms such that each ϕr : R ×{ Ms}r
s=1 → D. H1 is the null history. Let Ht, t ≥ 1,d e n o t et h es e t
of t-period aggregate histories and deﬁne St to be the set of period t mechanisms. A policy strategy for party i
is a sequence of functions σi = {σi
t}∞
t=1,w h e r eσi
t : Ht → St gives party i’s t-period mechanism as a function of
the aggregate history. We require that for all i, t and Ht ∈ Ht, (Ht,σi
t(Ht)) ∈ Ht+1.L e tσ = {σA,σB} denote a
proﬁle of policy strategies.
Message strategies Ap e r i o dt individual history of an agent ht =
¡
w,mt−1¢
gives the agent’s w-type and past
message history. Let J 1 denote the null set and for all t>1, J t = {{Mr,ϕ r}t
r=1,w ,m t−1 : {Mr,ϕ r}t
r=1 ∈ Ht+1,
w ∈ R,m t−1 ∈ {Mr}t−1
r=1} and P the space of ﬁnite element probability distributions. The ﬁrst component of agent
behavior is a message strategy, λ = {λt}
∞
t=1,w h e r eλt : J t × Θ → P maps the t +1 -period aggregate history and
the agent’s individual history and current shock to a lottery over the election winning message space Mt. Together
Ht and λ induce a cross sectional distribution over individual histories ht. This dispersion may be described by
am e a s u r es p a c e(R × Mt−1,Bt ⊗ Mt−1,Q t(Ht,λ)),w h e r eQt(Ht,λ) is the probability measure over individual
histories induced by Ht and λ.L e tP(R×Mt−1) denote the set of probability measures on (R×Mt−1,B⊗Mt−1).
As with policy strategies, agent strategies do not condition on the election-loosing allocations or the identities
7This assumption resembles Duggan and Fey’s (2006) assumption of outcome stationarity.
21of the election winning and loosing parties. In addition, the message strategy does not condition on the (so far
unspeciﬁed) voting behavior of the agent. This is without loss of generality. In our economy, agents are atomistic
and their individual votes do not determine the election winning mechanism. Thus, their current and past votes
do not inﬂuence the payoﬀ from sending a particular message.









J t ×Jt ×Ξ× ∆ includes two aggregate-individual histories that coincide up to date t−1, but include the current
mechanism proposals of, respectively, party A and party B. It also includes the agents current political preference
shocks. An agent’s voting strategy is given by ζ = {ζt}∞
t=1,w h e r eζt : J t ×Jt × Ξ × ∆ → P({A,B}) maps
individual political histories to a probability distribution over {A,B}.A f t e re a c hh
p
t, the agent draws the name
of a party from the distribution ζt (h
p
t) and then votes for that party. Note that an agent’s voting strategy does
not condition on her past votes since these are anonymous and do not aﬀect her preferences over the parties.8
Resource-feasibility To be resource feasible given λ, a mechanism must consume an amount of resources less
than R.




Let St(λ,Ht) denote the set of date t resource-feasible mechanisms at Ht given the message strategy λ.G i v e nλ,
an aggregate history Ht = {Sr}t−1
r=1 is resource-feasible if each Sr ∈ Sr(λ,{Ss}r−1
s=1).G i v e nλ,l e tHt(λ) denote
8As with the policy strategies, voting strategies do not condition on past election loosing policies or the identity of a winning party.
22the set of t-period resource-feasible aggregate histories. Finally, given λ,ap o l i c ys t r a t e g yσi is resource-feasible
if after each Ht ∈ Ht(λ), σi
t(Ht) ∈ St(λ,Ht).
Let Σ(λ) denote the set of resource-feasible policy strategy proﬁles given λ. We do not allow political parties to
make resource-infeasible policy proposals and, henceforth, restrict attention to resource-feasible policy strategies.
Strategy proﬁle outcomes A mechanism is implemented at date t if it either wins more than 50% of the vote
or, in the event of a tie, it wins a fair coin toss. The strategy proﬁle (σ,ζ,λ) together with the shock distributions
F and G induce a family of conditional probability distributions over current and future mechanisms, incumbent





t|ζ) denote the probability that mechanism Si
t wins an election for party i when the aggregate
history is Ht,p a r t yj proposes S
j
t and the voting strategy is ζ. Second, any continuation equilibrium induces a
continuation outcome allocation. Each of these in turn implies continuation payoﬀs for agents as functions of their
histories. Let Ut(Ht+1,h t|σ,ζ,λ) denote the continuation payoﬀ implied by (σ,ζ,λ) after history (Ht+1,h t) and
let Wt(Ht|σ,ζ,λ) denote the utilitarian payoﬀ at t prior to the determination of the period t election winner.









































234.2 Politically credible equilibria
We describe the elements of an equilibrium below and then collect these elements into a formal deﬁnition.
Policy strategies Since the politicians operating party i are concerned only with winning the current election,
they select σi so that for all t, Ht, j 6= i,
σi







In doing so they ignore the fact that their proposals may reduce the lifetime payoﬀs obtained by agents in previous
or future periods and may, hence, contribute to electoral failure in those periods. In particular, parties cannot
commit themselves to future policies.
Message strategies Agents choose message strategies that are optimal after each individual history ht. For all
t, (Ht+1,h t) ∈ J t,
∀b λ, Ut(Ht+1,h t|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ Ut(Ht+1,h t|σ,ζ,b λ). (12)
Voting strategies Let Si
t denote the mechanism proposed by party i at time t. The total continuation payoﬀ
to an agent, inclusive of ideological payoﬀ, after individual political history h
p
t =( ( Ht,SA
t ,h t),(Ht,SB
t ,h t),ξ,δt)
and a period t election victory for party i is:
Ut(Ht,Si









24where 1{i=B} takes the value 1 if i equals B and is 0 otherwise. Let ∆Ut(Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ): =Ut(Ht,SA
t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ)
− Ut(Ht,SB





















the (normalized) diﬀerence in ideological payoﬀs across the two proposals to an agent with political history h
p
t.W e
assume that agents vote as if they were pivotal in the current period and vote for the party that maximizes their
current payoﬀ. This corresponds to the requirement that agents eliminate weakly dominated strategies in each
stage game (see, for example, Baron and Kalai (1993) or Duggan and Fey (2006)). Thus, their voting strategy
satisﬁes for all t, h
p
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Politically credible equilibria Collecting these components of an equilibrium together we have the following
formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 (σ,ζ,λ) is a politically credible equilibrium (PCE) if σ ∈ Σ(λ) and
1. (Party optimality) ∀t, Ht ∈ Ht, i ∈ {A,B}, σi satisﬁes (11);
2. (Agent optimality: messages) ∀t, (Ht+1,h t) ∈ J t,b λ, λ satisﬁes (12);
3. (Agent optimality: voting) ∀t, h
p
t ∈ J t ×Jt × Ξ × ∆,ζsatisﬁes (13).
A symmetric politically credible equilibrium (SPCE) is a PCE that satisﬁes the symmetry condition:
254. σA = σB.
These deﬁnitions are in the spirit of Chari and Kehoe’s sustainable plans equilibrium concept. They require
optimality of player strategies after all aggregate and individual histories.
Characterization of equilibria Recall that continuation play of the game depends only on which mechanism
wins the election, not which party. If the two parties propose the same mechanism then the continuation outcome
path is independent of the electoral outcome and an agent’s vote is determined solely by its current political
shocks: ζt(h
p
t;A)=1(resp. 0) if 0 >ξ+ δt (resp. 0 <ξ+ δt). In this case, party A wins the election with
probability p = G(−F−1(1/2)) and party B with probability 1 − G(−F−1(1/2)).S i n c ep a r t yA is always able to
mimic B and choose the same mechanism, p places a lower bound on its probability of winning. Conversely, party
B can always mimic party A and secure a probability of winning of 1 − p. It follows that in any (continuation)
equilibrium party A m u s tw i nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yp i ne a c hp e r i o d .W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a .
Lemma 2 Party A wins the election with probability p = G(−F−1(1/2)) in each period. When F and G satisfy
Assumption 8, p = 1
2.
We can use Lemma 2 and (13) to substitute an agent’s current voting function ζt from (11) and, hence, obtain
an equilibrium expression for the probability that a party wins an election in terms of current policy proposals,
history and future strategies. We have the following.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the probability that party A wins the election given Ht, the current proposals SA
t
26and SB
























t |σ,ζ,λ). When F and G satisfy Assumption 8, for i ∈ {A,B},













Proof: It follows that in any (continuation) equilibrium party A m u s tw i nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yp in each period.
Thus, regardless of current play, D(Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,ξ,δt|σ,ζ,λ)=( 1− β)(ξ + δt) and the current electoral outcome
aﬀects neither the probability distribution over future government incumbents nor expected future political payoﬀs.
Now, the fraction of type-ht agents who vote for party A given the aggregate shock δt is the fraction such that
∆Ut(Ht,SA
t ,SB







. The fraction of the population









Qt(dht).Finally, the probability that this fraction is




























It follows immediately from this proposition that under Assumption 8, the policy optimality condition (11) is
equivalent to
σi




Thus, the parties behave as if they are utilitarian planners who take the future message and policy strategies as
given.
27Remark After any aggregate history, the weighted average ideological payoﬀ to agents is constant across
equilibria. Consequently, in the remainder of the paper, we rank equilibria according to the weighted average
utilitarian payoﬀ attained by their outcome allocation. ¥
4.3 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for politically credible outcome paths
In this section, we formally deﬁne an outcome path, essentially an event tree of mechanisms coupled with a
reporting strategy restricted to aggregate histories on the tree. We give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an
outcome path to be induced by a PCE. Outcome paths are more complicated than allocations as we have previously
deﬁned them, additional randomness is introduced into utility awards by the uncertain nature of elections and by
the mixed strategy message strategies employed by agents. In the next section, we specialize PCE so that they
induce allocations as deﬁned in Section 2. As a precursor to this analysis we introduce the idea of a no insurance
PCE.
No insurance PCE A building block of our subsequent analysis is the no insurance PCE. In this politicians
repeatedly propose mechanisms that provide no insurance against taste shocks and agents send messages that
maximize their current payoﬀ. Under Assumption 8, reversion to this equilibrium minimizes the probability that
a defecting party will win an election and, hence, maximizes the electoral discipline on the parties. If an allocation
can be sustained, it can be sustained by reversion to this equilibrium.
A mechanism St =( Mt,ϕ t) oﬀers no insurance against taste shocks if for each ht,a n dmt,m 0
t in Mt ϕt(ht,m t)=
ϕt(ht,m 0
t). Such a mechanism gives agents the same utility regardless of the message that they send and, hence,
prevents agents with a larger taste shock from obtaining more resources. We focus on one particular no insurance
28mechanism in the remainder which we denote SNI
t =( Θ,ϕ NI
t ). This mechanism is direct - it uses Θ as its message
space - and has an allocation function ϕNI
t that satisﬁes for all (ht,θ), ϕNI
t (ht,θ)=u(R).W e d e ﬁne the no
insurance policy strategy proﬁle σNI as for all i, t, Ht, σi
t(Ht)=SNI
t . If the future play of politicians conforms
to σNI, then an agent’s continuation payoﬀ is unaﬀected by her current message and it is optimal for her to send
a message that maximizes her current payoﬀ. This motivates our deﬁnition of the no insurance message strategy
λNI. For all t, Ht+1,h t,θset λNI
t (Ht,S t,h t,θ)=1 θ,i fθ ∈ argmaxm∈Mt ϕt(ht,θ0) and λNI
t (Ht,S t,h t,θ)=1 m0,
some m0 ∈ argmaxm∈Mt ϕt(ht,θ) otherwise. Thus, λNI requires that agents maximize their current payoﬀ and, if
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Now, by (15), ζNI satisﬁes the optimality condition for voting and, as asserted above, λNI is optimal for an agent
given σNI and ζNI. The optimality of σNI follows from the fact that if agents play according to λNI,t h e ni t
is not possible to provide them with any insurance, sincen oa g e n tw i l ls e n dam e s s a g er e s u l t i n gi nl o wc u r r e n t
consumption. Under Assumption 8, we then have
SNI




and so σNI is optimal for politicians. It follows immediately that (σNI,ζNI,λ NI) is a PCE. We have the following
result.
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 8 hold. 1) (σNI,ζNI,λ NI) is a PCE. 2) Amongst PCE’s (σNI,ζNI,λ NI) delivers the
lowest utilitarian payoﬀ.
29Outcome paths The previous proposition identiﬁes the no insurance equilibrium as the one that gives the
lowest utilitarian payoﬀ W = E[θ]u(R). We put this to use below and provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a family of mechanisms and message functions to be the outcome of a PCE. In addition to resource-feasibility
and message optimality, our requirement is that the family provide a politician with a payoﬀ in excess of the no
insurance one at all dates. To state the result, we provide a formal deﬁnition of an outcome path.
Recursively deﬁne an outcome path to be a tuple Υ = {{HΥ
t }, {J Υ
t },{σΥ
t },{λΥ
t }},w h e r eHΥ













t = {{Mr,ϕ r}t
r=1,w,{mr}t−1
r=1 :( {Mr,ϕ r}t−1
r=1,w,{mr}t−2
r=1) ∈ J Υ















r=1) equals some (Mt,ϕ t) such that ϕt : R ×{ Mr}t
r=1 → D)a n dλΥ
t : J Υ
t × Θ → P (with for all
t, {{Mr,ϕ r}t
r=1,w,{mr}t−1
r=1,θ} ∈ J Υ
t × Θ λΥ
t ({Mr,ϕ r}t
r=1,w,{mr}t−1
r=1,θ) placing all probability mass on Mt).
We suppose that after each Ht ∈ HΥ
t , σ
Υ,A
t (Ht) is picked with probability p and σ
Υ,B
t (Ht) with probability
1 − p. An outcome path is simpler than an equilibrium: it does not describe what happens after a history that
is not generated by the path and it omits the voting strategy. Moreover, a PCE induces an outcome path. We
now provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an outcome path to be an equilibrium one. In the following
proposition we use UΥ
t (Ht+1,h t|b λ
Υ
) to denote the continuation payoﬀ to an agent along the outcome path Υ if




t }, b λ
Υ
t : J Υ
t+1 × Θ → P. QΥ
t (Ht) denotes the cross sectional distribution
of individual histories implied by the outcome path at aggregate history Ht.
The next proposition asserts that, under Assumption 8, an outcome path is a PCE outcome path if it satisﬁes
resource and incentive-feasibility condition and a political sustainability condition (18).
30Proposition 6 Let Assumption 8 hold. Let Υ = {{HΥ
t }, {J Υ
t },{σΥ
t },{λΥ
t }} be an outcome path and let QΥ
t (Ht,dh t)
denote the induced distribution over individual histories after Ht ∈ HΥ
t . Υ is an PCE outcome path if and only if:






t+1(Ht+1,dh t+1) ≤ R; (16)





t (Ht+1,h t|σΥ,λ Υ) ≥ UΥ
t (Ht+1,h t|σΥ,b λ
Υ
); (17)








t (Ht),h t|σΥ,λ Υ)QΥ
t (Ht,dh t) ≥ W. (18)
4.4 Outcome paths to allocations: Two simpliﬁcations
A Revelation principle Our deﬁnition of PCE does not require that agents truthfully reveal their type.
However, any politically credible distribution of payoﬀs can be implemented by an equilibrium in which 1) political
parties always propose direct mechanisms and 2) it is optimal for agents to be truthful along the equilibrium
outcome path. More formally, we have the following Revelation principle for our environment.
Deﬁnition 3 A mechanism St =( Mt,ϕ t) is direct if Mt = Θ.A p o l i c y s t r a t e g y σ is direct if for all i, t, Ht,
σi
t(Ht) is direct.
Deﬁnition 4 Let St be a direct mechanism. λ is truthful after individual history (Ht,S t,h t) ∈ J t if, for all θ,
λt(Ht,S t,h t,θ)=1 θ.
31Proposition 7 (Revelation Principle) Let (σ,ζ,λ) be a PCE. Then there exists another PCE (ˆ σ,ˆ ζ,ˆ λ) such
that 1) ˆ σ is direct, 2) ˆ λ is truthful after all histories (Ht,σ t(Ht),h t) ∈ J t and 3) the equilibrium (ˆ σ,ˆ ζ,ˆ λ) delivers
the same lifetime payoﬀ to each w-type of agent as the original equilibrium (σ,ζ,λ).
The proof is similar to that given in Sleet and Yeltekin (2006) and is not repeated. It utilizes Proposition 6
above; by this proposition any PCE outcome path can be supported by trigger strategies that revert to the no
insurance equilibrium following the electoral victory of a defecting political party. Using the standard proof of
the Revelation Principle any equilibrium outcome path can be replaced with one that uses direct mechanisms and
delivers the same expected utility to agents if they are truthful as they would have received under the original
equilibrium. A political party that makes proposals consistent with this new outcome path generates the same
utilitarian payoﬀs at each date and has the same probability of winning an election as before. A party that deviates
triggers play of the no insurance worst equilibrium if it is elected. This lowers the party’s probability of winning
an election and removes any political incentive to deviate.
It follows from Proposition 7 that, from a welfare perspective, there is no loss of generality in restricting
attention to equilibria that use direct mechanisms and induce truthful reporting. Hence, for the remainder of this
section, we restrict attention to politically credible equilibria (σ,ζ,λ) satisfying:
Property 1 (Truthful reporting) σ is direct along its outcome path and λ is truthful along this path.
Of course, we continue to allow political parties to deviate to non-direct mechanisms.
Symmetry We also simplify in the remainder by focussing on symmetric PCE, i.e. PCE’s satisfying:
32Property 2 (Symmetry) σA = σB.
Under these restrictions, a PCE induces an allocation of the form {ϕt}∞
t=1, ϕt : R×Θt → D. Neither elections
nor agent’s message strategies introduce any additional uncertainty over an agent’s utility award; these awards
can be expressed as functions of the agent’s w-type and her (truthfully reported) sequence of shocks. We deﬁne a
politically credible allocation to be one induced by a PCE satisfying the above properties.
4.5 Politically credible allocations
The following proposition asserts that an allocation is politically credible if only if it is resource-feasible, incentive-
compatible and politically sustainable.
Proposition 8 Let Assumption 8 hold. {ϕt}∞
t=1 is a politically credible allocation if and only if it satisﬁes (1),
(2) and the political constraints
∀t, Zt(U({ϕt+r|·}∞









Ψ(dw) − W ≥ 0. (19)
The proof of this proposition is a specialization of that given for Proposition 6 to equilibria that are truthful
and symmetric; it is omitted. Given this result, it is clear that we can recover a best politically credible allocation











θtϕt(w,θt)πt(θt)Ψ(dw) s.t. (1), (2), and (19). (20)
Problem (20) is a special case of our reduced form problem (5). The political constraints (19) incorporate relatively
simple political viability functions that satisfy Assumptions 2-6. In this case, X =0and for all t, ht, z∗
r(ht)=1 .
Thus, the following specialization of Proposition 3 holds.
33Proposition 9 Suppose that {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (20). Then there is a sequence {μ∗
t}∞




























1 = βt−1 Qt
r=1(1+μ∗
r) ≥ βt−1. Conversely, if {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 solves (21) for some {μ∗
t}∞



















In addition, the functions {Zt}∞
t=1 satisfy Assumption 7 and, hence, Proposition 4 applies. We conclude
that in an optimal PCE, short-sighted politicians concerned only with winning current elections implement the
same allocation as a planner who is more patient than agents. Such politicians cannot commit to severe limiting




5.1 Non -uniform preference distributions [Incomplete]











































where E denotes the set of PCE’s and p is deﬁned as before. If these conditions hold, then each party is better
oﬀ adhering to the strategy proﬁle and accepting the equilibrium election-winning probabilities p and 1 − p,
than defecting to Si
t and triggering the worst (from the perspective of their electoral opportunities) continuation
equilibrium. When F is uniform, then these conditions reduce to the requirement that for all Ht,
Z
Ut(Ht,σi
t(Ht),h t|σ,ζ,λ)Qt(dht) ≥ W,
which in turn reduces to (18) for politically credible allocations.10 If G is uniform on ∆, but F not, the analysis
is more complicated. To simplify it somewhat suppose that F is symmetric (i.e. F(x)=−F(−x) for all x)a n d
focus on symmetric, truth-telling PCE. As shown in the appendix















10In fact the previous uniform assumption on G is not necessary for these results.















where σt(Ht) is the common policy proposal implied by σ after history Ht. Now any defecting politician will
propose a mechanism ({m},ϕ 0
t) with a message space that consists of a single message and an allocation function
that conditions only on past histories ht. Similarly, the payoﬀ function Ut+1 implied by the defection-triggered
continuation equilibrium depends only upon histories ht. Intuitively, agents will only send a message that is not
current utility maximizing if they are compensated with a more generous continuation utility. If eliciting such an
message and providing such a continuation utility raises the defecting politician’s election-winning probability, the
minimizing continuation equilibrium will not provide it. Thus, current message-sending cannot be used to provide
insurance and further the electoral prospects of a defecting politician. Indeed, partitioning agents according to
their current message may give greater scope for punishing the politician. The implied political constraints on an
allocation {ϕt}∞


























with X =0 . Assuming that a pair of optimizing functions ϕ∗
t and U∗
t+1 exists for (24), then (see the Appendix)









the density of F.I ng e n e r a l ,s y m m e t r yo fF implies that Zt is not concave (the exception is the case considered
previously, F uniform). By appealing to generalized Kuhn-Tucker arguments, the necessity part of Proposition 3
36can still be obtained. We have that if {ϕ∗
t}∞



























r(w,θr−1)) ≥ βt−1 and {z∗
t}∞















according to our earlier procedure.
Interpretation The main term in the political constraint gives the probability that party A will win the election
at t after making its best possible defection (given continuation play which is designed to inﬂict the maximum
electoral penalty on a defecting party). In our model, the population of agents is partitioned by their past histories.
Agents with the same political biases, but diﬀerent histories will, in general, receive diﬀerent allocations along both
the equilibrium path and the defecting path. Consequently, they will have diﬀerent attitudes towards a defection.
Within each history-speciﬁc subpopulation, there will be a swing voter - an agent whose bias value ξ renders him
indiﬀerent between the equilibrium path and the defection. The ξ-identity of the swing voter will usually diﬀer
across history subpopulations. Political constraints are relaxed at the margin if swing voters are attracted away
from the defection. When F is uniform, the number of swing voters within each subpopulation is proportional to
the number of agents in the subpopulation, so the political constraint reduces to a bound on a utilitarian payoﬀ.
When F is non-uniform, this is no longer the case. The number of swing voters in a sub-population depends
37on the value of the density f evaluated at that sub-population’s gain or loss from the defection. Subpopulations
with relatively more swing voters (higher values of f) will receive relatively greater weight in the virtual planner’s
objective.11
5.2 Incumbency advantage
We revert to uniform F and G distributions. Incumbency advantage can be introduced in a simple way by









where φt = φ>0 if party i is in power at t−1 and at t and 0 otherwise, and φ ∈ (0,1/(2b ξ)−2d−1/(2b δ)].A l le l s e
equal, the introduction of the φt variable raises the probability of an incumbent party being re-elected. Suppose
that party A was in power at t − 1 a n di nt h ep e r i o dt election, proposed the same mechanism as party B.S i n c e
political strategies condition only on election winning outcomes, agents face the same allocation in current and
future periods regardless of who they vote for. Thus, agents base their vote on ideological considerations alone. All
those agents with ξ<φ− δt vote for party A and A’s probability of winning the election is G(φ) > 1
2. As before,
mimicking party B need not constitute equilibrium behavior, but it does place a lower bound on A’s probability
of winning. On the other hand, B could mimic A and win with 1 − G(φ) < 1
2. This places an upper bound on
11In the static probabilistic voting literature, it is usual to assign diﬀerent uniform F distributions exogenously to diﬀerent types
of agents, thus generating diﬀerential weighting in the electoral process. Here, with a common non-uniform shock distribution F
this diﬀerential weighting arises endogenously. The provision of incentives leads to diﬀerent continuation allocations for diﬀerent
history-types so creating a dispersed population of swing voters who receive diﬀerent weights according to f.
38the probability with which party A could win. We conclude that if party A is in power at date t − 1,i tw i n s
with probability G(φ) at date t, while if it was out of power at t − 1, it wins with probability 1 − G(φ).T h e s e
probabilities hold independently of the speciﬁc history of election-winning mechanisms generated by past play.
A very similar argument to that given in the previous section implies that parties seeking to maximize their
probability of re-election propose mechanisms that maximize the utilitarian payoﬀ to agents given future play.
After specializing to symmetric PCE with truth-telling, we recover the political constraints 18 and Proposition 9.
The only change in this setting is to the probability of any given party winning an election conditional on which
party was in oﬃce in the prior period.
5.3 Patient political parties
We now show that political parties that care about both current and future elections make the same choices as






where now χ ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor. We assume that there are no incumbency advantages.
As before any triple (σ,ζ,λ) induces an outcome path and, hence, a sequence {pi
t(Ht,σ t(Ht)| ζ)} that gives the
conditional probability that party i will win after each history. Let V i(σ,ζ,λ|Ht) denote the continuation payoﬀ
to party i from (σ,ζ,λ) after the history Ht; V i satisﬁes the recursion:
V i(σ,ζ,λ|Ht)=pi






39The natural extension of our earlier equilibrium deﬁnition is:
Deﬁnition 5 (σ,ζ,λ) is a politically credible equilibrium if σ ∈ Σ(λ) and
1. (Party optimality) For all t, Ht−1, i,j ∈ {A,B}, j 6= i and all b σi that are resource-feasible given λ
V i(σi,σj,ζ,λ|Ht) ≥ V (b σi,σj,ζ,λ|Ht); (27)
2. (Agent optimality: voting) ∀t,Ht−1,SA
t ,SB
t ,h t,ξ,δt, ζsatisﬁes (13);
3. (Agent optimality: messages) ∀t,Ht,ht,b λ, λ satisﬁes (12).
All that has changed here is condition (27), which generalizes our earlier political optimality condition to allow
for political discount factors in excess of 0. This criterion initially appears more complicated than before. A policy
choice eﬀects both the probability of winning in the current period and, through its aﬀect on the game’s history,
its probability of winning in subsequent periods. Potentially, a party might trade these probabilities oﬀ against
each other, sacriﬁcing its chances of winning today, in order to improve its future electoral prospects. In fact this
does not happen. Even with these more complicated preferences, each party chooses its current mechanism to
maximize the current utilitarian payoﬀ, given its future play and the play of its rival.
Proposition 10 (σ,ζ,λ) is a PCE of a game with patient parties who have discount factor χ>0 if and only if
it is a PCE of a game with impatient parties who have discount factor χ =0 .
Proof: Suppose that (σA,σB,ζ,λ) is a credible equilibrium of a game with patient parties, then it is resource-
feasible and satisﬁes agent optimality. It remains to check that
σi







40As before, party A can always win elections with probability p (and obtain the payoﬀ p)s i m p l yb ym a k i n gt h e
same choices as party B and playing σB.T h u s ,p places a lower bound on party A’s payoﬀ. Symmetrically, party
B’s payoﬀ is also bounded below by 1 − p. But, then









Hence, party A always earn a payoﬀ of p in equilibrium; moreover, by the same argument, a party A’s continuation
equilibrium payoﬀ after any history is also p. Now consider party A’s play after history Ht. The payoﬀ to party
A if it defects to SA





Whether party A wins or looses in the present does not aﬀect its equilibrium continuation payoﬀ and, so, it chooses
policy simply to maximize its current payoﬀ. It follows that equilibrium strategies must maximize the per period
probability of winning. The same logic applies to party B.
Conversely, if (σA,σB,ζ,λ) is a PCE of a game with impatient parties (χ =0 ), then it is resource-feasible and
satisﬁes the agent optimality conditions. It remains to check that it satisﬁes the political optimality criteria (27)
for χ>0. Now, in the game with impatient parties, party A wins an election with probability p in each period
conditional on the past history of the game. Thus, for all i, t, Ht, V A(σi,σj,λ|Ht+1)=p. It follows that



















t (Ht) maximizes pA
t (Ht,SA
t ,σB
t (Ht)|ζ), it follows that it also satisﬁes the “one step no deviation condition”
σA

















Thus, regardless of the value of χ,p a r t yA has no incentive to defect from σA for one period and then revert to this
strategy. By a standard argument, given the boundedness of payoﬀs, party A has no incentive to undertake even
an inﬁnite series of deviations from σA.T h u s ,σA satisﬁes the party optimality condition (27). By an identical
argument σB satisﬁes this condition as well. ¥
Thus, the set of PCE’s is independent of the politicians’ discount factor. This independence extends to
symmetric, truth-telling PCE’s and, hence, the conditions for a politically credible allocation are unaltered. In
particular, with Assumption ?? reinstated, the political constraints (18) continue to hold, as do Propositions 4
and 9. We conclude that in an optimal PCE, politicians implement the same allocation as a planner who is
more patient than agents regardless of their discount factor. Such politicians cannot commit to severe limiting
allocations even if they raise their electoral prospects. Note that one cannot appeal to a folk theorem-type result
to the eﬀect that political constraints are relaxed as politicians become more patient. Punishment for a defection
is essentially immediate, but nonetheless the force for immiseration ensures that political constraints (eventually)
bind.
426 The model with rents
In this section, we alter the objective of political parties. Previously, we assumed that parties were motivated
only by their desire to win oﬃce. We now suppose that they care about the rents that they can extract while in




t is the amount of rent extracted by party i if it wins the date t election and pi
t is the probability that
i wins. Parties are now prepared to trade the probability of winning oﬃce oﬀ against the amount of rent they
obtain if they do win.
As before each party proposes a mechanism St in successive periods. In contrast to earlier sections, however,
any resources not allocated to agents are appropriated by the candidate as rent. We modify our earlier deﬁnition
of a politically credible equilibrium to accommodate our new political objective.
Deﬁnition 6 (σ,ζ,λ) is a politically credible equilibrium in the model with political rents if σ ∈ Σ(λ) and
1. (Party optimality) t, Ht, i ∈ {A,B}, σi satisﬁes
σi























2. (Agent optimality: messages) ∀t,Ht+1,ht,b λ, λ satisﬁes (12);
3. (Agent optimality: voting) ∀t,Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,h t,ξ,δt, ζsatisﬁes (13).
43Our earlier analysis of PCE’s used the fact that in any equilibrium the probability with which a party won an
election was independent of the past history aggregate history. This is no longer true in general in the model with
political rents. To simplify the analysis, we focus on symmetric political credible equilibria. In these both political
parties use the same political strategy. Under Assumption ??, symmetric PCE (without incumbency advantages)
imply a probability of electoral victory for either party of 1
2. Using similar arguments to those in Section 4, the
party optimality condition (29) can be rewritten as:
σi
















where the bracketed term gives the probability that party i wins.
Lemma 4 Let Wt(Ht)=i n f {σ,ζ,λ}∈SE Wt(σ,ζ,λ|Ht) denote the worst utilitarian payoﬀ attainable by a continu-
ation SPCE after aggregate history Ht.L e tW =i n f Ht Wt(Ht) and assume that there is some b HT and (b σ,b ζ,b λ)
such that WT(b σ,b ζ,b λ| b Ht)=W. Then, there is an equilibrium (σ,ζ,λ) such that W1(σ,ζ,λ)=W.
Once again, the period 1 utilitarian payoﬀs induced by a (symmetric) PCE can be induced by a symmetric
PCE that relies on direct mechanisms and induces truth-telling along its equilibrium paths. Again, the basic logic
is that concealing information from the government does not lower a party’s worst defection payoﬀ and there is
no reason to do it. We state this formally in the next lemma, whose proof is omitted.
Proposition 11 (Revelation Principle) Let (σ,ζ,λ) be an SPCE equilibrium in the game with political rents.
Then there exists another SPCE (ˆ σ,ˆ ζ,ˆ λ) in this game such that 1) ˆ σ is direct, 2) ˆ λ is truthful after all histories
(Ht,σ t(Ht),h t) and 3) the equilibrium (ˆ σ,ˆ ζ,ˆ λ) delivers the same payoﬀst oe a c hw- t y p ea g e n ta st h eo r i g i n a l
equilibrium (σ,ζ,λ).
44Given this, we can once again restrict attention to equilibria that rely on direct mechanisms and that induce
truth-telling along their equilibrium paths. We again refer to such any such allocation induced by an SPCE as a
politically credible allocation (PCA).
Proposition 12 {ϕt}∞
t=1 is a politically credible allocation in the model with political rents if and only if it satisﬁes













r=0))) = −supr00∈[0,R] r00
n
1
2 +b δ [E[θ]u(R − r00)+βW − Wt({ϕt}∞
t=1)]
o
≤ 0 and X(y)=1
2y.
Proof: Any PCA must be incentive-compatible. It remains to check (??). Let (σ,ζ,λ) denote the PCE
that induces {ϕt}∞
t=1. A party can always feasibly defect at t to a mechanism (Θ, e ϕt),w h e r ef o ra l l(w,θt),
e ϕt(w,θt)=u(R − r), r ∈ [0,R]. If the party defects in this way, it induces a continuation equilibrium with payoﬀ






















Since r was an arbitrary element of [0,R],w eh a v e( ??).
Suppose we have an allocation satisfying the conditions in the proposition. We need to construct a PCE that










t),w,θt)=1 m∗,w h e r em∗ ∈ argmaxm∈M0
t ϕ0
t(w,θt−1,m). In periods up to and including









t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ δt + ξ
0 if ∆Ut(Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ) <δ t + ξ.
(31)
Following a defection in period t, we use the equilibrium constructed in Lemma (4) to set continuation strategies
from period t+1onwards. This equilibrium induces the utilitarian payoﬀ W. The strategies (σ,ζ,λ) constructed



















the equilibrium is resource-feasible along its outcome path.
Given that parties adhere to their strategies and no defection wins the election, incentive-compatibility of
the allocation ensures that truth-telling message is optimal. Following defection, subsequent play reverts to the
worst equilibrium with utilitarian payoﬀ W; this continuation equilibrium makes no use of previously revealed
information and so it is optimal for agents to send the message that maximizes their current payoﬀ in the period
of the defection. Given the constructed message strategy, a party’s optimal defection at date t is to a mechanism
(Θ, e ϕt), where for all (w,θt), e ϕt(w,θt)=u(R − r∗










+b δ [E[θ]u(R − r)+βW − Wt({ϕt}∞
t=1)]
¾
But, (??) no party has an incentive to undertake such a defection (or any sequence of such defections). Agents
voting strategies are optimal in the periods up to and including a defection. Finally, the use of the equilibrium
with payoﬀ W to construct continuation strategies following a defection ensures the optimality of player decisions
46in the periods following a defection. Hence, (σ,ζ,λ) is a (symmetric) PCE and the allocation is a PCA as desired.
¥
Remark In this case, given Assumption 8, Zt(U) < 0 for all U ∈ Ut and the political constraints bind in all








> 0 and so
t h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t sa r en o n - b i n d i n g .¥
We now check that the political constraints in the rent-seeking model satisfy our earlier Assumptions 3-4.
Lemma 5 The functions {Zt}∞
t=1 satisfy Assumptions 2, 3 and 4. X satisﬁes 5. {Zt}∞









+b δ{(1 − β)E[θ]u(R − b r)+βW − B}
¸
has derivative: Z0(B)=r∗(B),w h e r er∗(B)=a r gm a x b r∈[0,R] b r
h
1
2 +b δ{(1 − β)E[θ]u(R − b r)+βW − B}
i
.B u tt h e
ﬁrst order condition for r∗(B) is:
1
2






−2(1 − β)E[θ]u0(R − r∗(B)) + r∗(B)(1 − β)E[θ]u00(R − r∗(B))
< 0.
Thus, Z00(B)=∂r∗








is concave, verifying Assumption 3. It is easy to show that the Fréchet derivative of Zt is given by hb zt(u),·i,w h e r e







Θt βr−1θt+rϕt+r(w,θt+r)π(θt+r)Ψ(dw)) ≥ 0 and
r∗















This veriﬁes Assumptions 2 and 4. That X satisﬁes 5 is immediate; 6 is readily veriﬁed. ¥
It follows from Proposition 12 and the above remark that a Pareto-optimal, politically credible allocation in











subject to (1), (2) and (30). Given Lemma 5, we can apply Proposition 3 to obtain the following.
Proposition 13 Let Assumptions (2)-(6) hold. Suppose that {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (33). Then there
is a sequence {μ∗
t}∞
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1 = μ1z∗




























t = Rt −
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C(ϕ∗
t(w,θt)πt(θt)Ψ(dw). Conversely, if {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 solves (34) for some {μ∗
t}∞















r) < ∞,a n di f
1. μ1b δr∗
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This is clearly in the class of problems considered by Farhi and Werning (2006) or Sleet and Yeltekin (2005).
Thus, the optimal Pareto problems from the model with political rents can be reformulated as ones in which com-
mitted planners use discount factors that exceed those of the agents and must implement particular distributions
of utility promises. It follows that political credibility considerations provide microfoundations for the sorts of
problems considered by FW and SY and, in particular, for the high planner discount factors assumed in both of
their papers.
Conversely, given an optimal planning problem of the sort considered by FW and SY, we can parameterize a
model with political rents so that it induces the solution of the planning problem as a (constrained) Pareto optimal

















C(ψt(v,θt))π(θt)Φ0(dv) ≥ 0 (37)
and, for all v






They establish that there are values for (R∗, Φ∗
0) such that the solution to this problem induces a Markov process
over promises of utility with Φ∗
0 as its invariant distribution. At (R∗, Φ∗
0), the solution to (36) has a sequence
49of Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraints (37) of the form {q∗bt−1}∞
t=1. Given these values and this
solution, we can recover a Lagrangian of the form (??) by setting Bt
1 = bt−1 and qt = q∗bt−1 a n db yu s i n gΦ0
and the Lagrange multipliers on the promise-keeping constraints to recover a distribution over Pareto weights Ψ0.
Time invariant values for φ and r∗ can be obtained using the formulas: b =( 1+δφr∗) and q∗ =
φ
1+b δφr∗. Finally,
we can set the parameters of the sustainability constraint (??), R and W0 to ensure that this constraint holds. If
W0 is the utilitarian payoﬀ attainable from some SPCE, then we have constructed an SPCA that is Pareto optimal
(for the distribution Ψ) given the use of the punishment equilibrium with utilitarian payoﬀ W0.
7 Political revision-proofness
7.1 Politically revision proof equilibria
We now revert to our baseline political economy game, with impatient oﬃce motivated parties and political bias
distributions satisfying Assumption 8. As we have seen PCE in this game can be reasonably severe; the worst from
a utilitarian perspective oﬀers no insurance against shocks at all. This suggests that a political party may seek to
coordinate agents onto a new equilibrium with a higher utilitarian payoﬀ in order to improve its current electoral
prospects. To this end, a party may propose a mechanism and a continuation equilibrium that describes how the
game should be played if the party is elected. How should voters evaluate such a proposal? We will assume that
proposals for future play are only accepted if voters believe that they are immune from further revision. If they
are not, voters disregard them and assume that future play will adhere to the original equilibrium. This leads
us to deﬁne an equilibrium as politically revision-proof if all possible proposed revisions to play are themselves
50vulnerable to further revisions. To formalize this idea, we introduce a renegotiation-proof equilibrium reﬁnement
in the spirit of Pearce (1987).
To begin with, we generalize somewhat our notion of a mechanism and a political strategy. Previously, we ﬁxed
an initial distribution of types Ψ. An agent’s type w identiﬁed the subpopulation to which the agent belonged.
Agents of diﬀerent types might receive diﬀerent weights in social criteria; they could also be treated diﬀerently
by a mechanism. We now allow political parties to assign types (or “names”) to agents in the initial period in
lotteries. Thus, the initial type or name distribution is endogenous rather than a parameter. For completeness,
we allow parties to rename agents in subsequent periods.12
Suppose that at the beginning of each period t, agents are publicly distinguished by a history of names and






t maps an an agent’s history to a lottery over current names. As before, Mi
t is a message set and ϕi
t is
an allocation function (that now depends on histories of the form (wt,m t) that include past and current lottery
outcomes). The lottery ρi
t allows an incumbent government to name or rename agents. We revise all of earlier
deﬁnitions to accommodate these augmented mechanisms in the obvious way. For example, political strategies
map past histories of election-winning mechanisms to an augmented mechanism; voting and message strategies
now depend on past histories of these mechanisms, past (and in the case of message strategies current) lottery
outcomes as well as the relevant message histories and political preference parameters. Our previous deﬁnition
and analysis of PCE go through with only minor modiﬁcation.
12This latter ability, although it is not used on the equilibrium path, ensures that equilibria are recursive and that there is no
diﬀerence between what a party can do in period 1 relative to later periods.
51Political revisions and political revision-proofness We formalize the idea of a political revision. Suppose
that when confronted with a continuation equilibrium (σ,ζ,λ|Ht),p a r t yi has the option of conforming to the
equilibrium or defecting and proposing a current mechanism Si
1 and a new continuation equilibrium (σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Si
1)
that describes how everyone will play if party i wins the election.13 The defecting party’s manifesto might say: “If
you vote for us, we will forget the past and implement Si
1. Furthermore, a vote for us will be a vote to coordinate
play on the continuation equilibrium (σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Si
1).” To persuade agents to coordinate in this way and, hence, vote
for the party in the ﬁrst place, party i must at a minimum persuade them that there will not be further revisions
to this equilibrium. This motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 At r i p l e(σ,ζ,λ) is a politically revision-proof equilibria (PRPE) if 1) (σ,ζ,λ) is a PCE and
2) there exists no date t,h i s t o r yHt = {Ss}t−1
s=1 and alternative equilibrium (σ0,ζ0,λ 0) such that for all s and Hs
Ws(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Hs) ≥ y>W t(σ,ζ,λ|Ht).
An allocation is politically revision-proof if it is the outcome of a politically revision-proof equilibrium.
The intuition behind this reﬁnement is as follows. For agents to accept a political revision after some history,
they must be persuaded that there will be no attempt to revert to the original equilibrium at some point in the
future. To persuade agents of this, the revision must deliver continuation utilitarian payoﬀs that exceed the payoﬀ
from the original continuation equilibrium. In this case, any subsequent proposal to revert to the old continuation
equilibrium will strictly lower a party’s election probability. Agents may reasonably suppose that no such proposal
13Without loss of generality, the new mechanism and continuation equilibrium does not condition on past messages and lottery
outcomes.
52will be made, making the revision politically viable. An equilibrium is politically revision-proof if it admits no
such politically viable revisions. Our next lemma characterizes and provides an alternative interpretation of the
reﬁnement.
Lemma 6 Let E denote the set of politically credible equilibria. (σ,ζ,λ) ∈ E is politically revision-proof if and
only if it solves:





Proof: Suppose that (σ,ζ,λ) ∈ E satisﬁes the condition in the lemma. Consider a planner whose defection pro-
posalatsomeHt consists of St and the continuation equilibrium (σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Ht,S t). The pair ((Ht,S t),(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Ht,S t))
induces a family of continuation utilitarian payoﬀs. It is easy to check that this family can also be induced by some
(σ00,ζ00,λ 00) ∈ E. It follows that either Wt(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Ht,S t) ≤ c W ≤ Wt(σ,ζ,λ|Ht) or for some Hs−1 º (Ht−1,S t),
Ws(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Hs) ≤ c W ≤ Wt(σ,ζ,λ|Ht).T h u s ,(σ,ζ,λ) is politically revision-proof.
For the converse, suppose that (σ,ζ,λ) is politically revision-proof, but does not solve (38). Then there is
some history Ht and some ε>0 such that Wt(σ,ζ,λ|Ht) < c W − ε.B u t t h e n , w e c a n ﬁnd an alternative
equilibrium (σ0,ζ0,λ 0) such that for all s, Ws(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Hs) ≥ c W −ε>W t(σ,ζ,λ|Ht). This contradicts the political
revision-proofness of (σ,ζ,λ). ¥
It follows from this lemma that PRPE maximize the worst continuation utilitarian payoﬀ that might conceivably
occur. In this sense, they rely on “mild punishments” for a political defection. Our next lemma shows us that given
any politically revision-proof equilibrium, we can construct a simpler equilibrium that uses direct mechanisms,
lotteries over names only in the initial period, keeps promises and induces truth-telling. Moreover, this equilibrium
53induces the same continuation utilitarian payoﬀs along the outcome path as the original equilibrium.
Lemma 7 (Simplifying politically revision-proof equilibria) Let (σ,ζ,λ) denote a PRPE. There exists a PRPE
(σ0,ζ0,λ 0) satisfying:
1. σ0 is symmetric (i.e. σi0 = σj0);
2. σ0 is direct along the outcome path of the equilibrium;
3. λ0 is truthful along the outcome path of the equilibrium;
4. The allocation functions induced by σ0 along the outcome path of the equilibrium condition only upon the
lottery outcome in the initial period;
5. (σ0,λ 0,ζ0) “keeps promises” in the sense that if an agent is assigned the name w in the initial lottery ρ0
1 then
the continuation equilibrium delivers her an expected lifetime utility of w;
6. (σ0,λ 0,ζ0) induces the same continuation utilitarian payoﬀsa l o n gi t so u t c o m ep a t ha s(σ,ζ,λ).
The proof is straightforward, but long and we omit it. Equilibria satisfying conditions (1)-(5) of the above
lemma are signiﬁcantly more tractable than general PRPE. In particular, such PRPEs induce an initial name
distribution-allocation pair (ρ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) along their equilibrium paths. We call such a pair a politically revision-
proof allocation or PRPA.
Our goal is to show that PRPA solves a virtual planning problem with a patient planner. In fact, as we
argue below, subject to a technical qualiﬁcation, all PRPA solve the problem of a Rawlsian planner who has
54a unit discount factor14. Thus, by reﬁning our notion of political equilibrium and, implicitly, tightening the
political restrictions on allocations, we reinforce our earlier result that political systems populated with short-lived
politicians behave like (excessively) patient planners.
Relative to previous sections our method of proof is quite diﬀerent. Rather than obtaining explicit political
constraints as equilibrium restrictions and then reformulating the implied Lagrangian, we proceed by directly
comparing PRPA with allocations that are optimal for the Rawlsian planner.
7.2 Rawlsian planning problems
The sequence Rawlsian problem More formally, the Rawlsian planner solves:



















subject to the resource, incentive-compatibility and promise-keeping constraint, for all w ∈ W,




Stationary Rawlsian problem Closely, related to this Rawlsian problem is the following auxiliary stationary
cost problem. In this a planner chooses an invariant measure over agent utility promises Ψ and a pair of measurable
policy functions ϕ : W × Θ → D and w0 : W × Θ → W.T h eﬁrst of the policy functions gives an agent’s current
utility as a function of its current promise and shock, the second gives an agent’s continuation promise as a
function of these variables. The policy functions are chosen to satisfy recursive versions of the promise keeping
14The label “Rawlsian planner” stems from viewing an inﬁnitely lived agent as dynasty of single period lived, partially altruistic
generations. The Rawlsian planner uses intergenerational weights. See Phelan (2006).
55and incentive compatibility constraints. The function w0 and the probability distribution over shocks π imply a
Markov process for utility promises. Ψ is required to be an invariant measure for this process. Finally, the mean
utility implied by Ψ is required to exceed an exogenously given utility amount W. Formally, the stationary cost
problem at W is given by:





subject to the recursive promise-keeping condition:
∀w ∈ W, w =
X
Θ
[(1 − β)θϕ(w,θ)+βw0(w,θ)]π(θ), (42)
the recursive incentive-compatibility condition:
∀w ∈ W,k,j ∈ {1,···,K}, (1 − β)ˆ θkϕ(w,ˆ θk)+βw0(w,ˆ θk) ≥ (1 − β)ˆ θkϕ(w,ˆ θj)+βw0(w,ˆ θj), (43)
the steady state condition:









Any triple (Ψ,ϕ,w0) induces an allocation. It is routine to check that this allocation satisﬁes the (non-recursive)
incentive-compatibility constraints. Proposition 14 below makes use of this stationary Rawlsian problem.
567.3 Political revision-proofness and the Rawlsian planner
We now turn to the main result of this section and show, subject to a technical qualiﬁcation, that all PRPA
solve the problem of a Rawlsian planner. Conversely, any solution to this problem that delivers a constant payoﬀ
at all dates (i.e. is payoﬀ-stationary) is a PRPA. The proof works by showing that all PRPA are feasible for
the Rawlsian planner and, hence, any solution to the Rawlsian planner’s problem must deliver a weakly higher
(Rawlsian) payoﬀ. Working in the reverse direction, a name distribution and a politically credible allocation (i.e.
an allocation induced by a PCE) is obtained that attains the Rawlsian payoﬀ and gives a constant payoﬀ after all
aggregate histories. By (38), any PRPA must give a weakly higher payoﬀ after all histories than this allocation
and so its Rawlsian payoﬀ must weakly exceed that attained by the Rawlsian planner. Combining the arguments,
gives the desired result.
Proposition 14 Suppose the stationary cost solution has a solution at Wrawls,t h e n
1. Any PRPE (σ,ζ,λ) induces an allocation that solves the Rawlsian planner’s problem
2. Any payoﬀ stationary solution to the Rawlsian planner’s problem is a politically revision-proof allocation.
Proof: Any politically revision-proof equilibrium (σ,ζ,λ) induces an name distribution-allocation pair that is
resource-feasible. In light of Lemma 7, we may, without loss of generality, assume that this pair can be represented
by (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1),w h e r ee a c hϕt : W × Θ → D. Using Lemma 7, we may also assume, again without loss of
generality, that the allocation is incentive-compatible and satisﬁes promise-keeping. Hence, it is feasible for the
Rawlsian problem and Wrawls ≥ Wr(Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1),w h e r eWr(Ψ1,{ϕ0
t}∞
t=1) is the Rawlsian payoﬀ i m p l i e db yt h e
pair (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1).
57We now seek to show the reverse inequality. To do so, we use two arguments in Phelan (2006). First, by
Lemma 1 of Phelan (2006), if (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) solves the Rawlsian problem, then it also solves the following cost
problem at aggregate utility amount Wrawls a n dd o e ss ow i t hc o s to b j e c t i v eR:































Second, we can use the construction in Lemma 2, Phelan (2006), to obtain a stationary distribution-allocation
pair from (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) that 1) attains a per period aggregate cost less than R + ε for arbitrary ε>0,2 )h a s
invariant measure Ψ1 and 3) delivers a payoﬀ of at least Wrawls to the Rawlsian planner. It follows that if a
solution (Ψ∗
1,ϕ ∗,w0∗) exists to the stationary cost problem at Wrawls,t h e ni th a sac o s to fl e s st h a no re q u a lt oR.
Hence, the pair induced by this solution is resource-feasible. It is also incentive-compatible, keeps promises and




We can now construct a PCE that implements (Ψ∗
1,{ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1). In this the equilibrium political strategies
are such that both parties sequentially propose (ρ∗
t,Θ,ϕ ∗
t),w h e r eρ∗
1 = Ψ∗
1 and ρ∗







t). For other histories, recursively construct σi
t as follows. Given a history {ρs,M s,ϕ s}t−1
s=1,




t−r). Set the mes-
s a g es t r a t e g i e so fa g e n t sa sf o l l o w s . I fr denotes the date of the last election-winning defection and r<t ,
λt({ρs,M s,ϕ s}t
s=1,w,m t−1)=1 θ;i fr = t,s e tλt({ρs,M s,ϕ s}t
s=1,w,m t−1)=1 m∗, m∗ ∈ argmaxm∈Mt ϕt(w,mt−1,m).









t ,w,m t−1|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ δt + ξ
0 if ∆Ut(Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,w,m t−1|σ,ζ,λ) <δ t + ξ
(48)
This strategy is clearly optimal given the message and policy strategies. Moreover, it ensures that choosing a
current mechanism to maximize the probability of winning is equivalent to choosing such a mechanism to maximize




with payoﬀ Wrawls >Wis induced. If a party defects and wins at t, the policy strategies call for the parties to
restart this pair by successively proposing (ρ∗
s,Θ,ϕ ∗
s) in periods t + s. Agents are truthful provided a party has
not defected and won the election in the current period, in which case, they give the message that maximizes
their current payoﬀ. Given this behavior of agents, the continuation utilitarian payoﬀ and, hence, the election
probability of a defecting party, is maximized by a defection to a no insurance mechanism. But since Wrawls >W,
even this defection lowers the party’s election winning probability. The party will not wish to make it. Since
the stationary solution to the Rawlsian problem is incentive-compatible, it is optimal for agents to be truthful
during its implementation. Since the political strategy described above calls for parties to ignore past messages
and begin reimplementing the solution to the Rawlsian problem following the election victory of a defecting party,
it is optimal for agents to send messages that maximize their current payoﬀ in the aftermath of a defection. Thus,
these strategies constitute a PCE. Denote it (σr,ζr,λ r).
Recall that any PRPE (σ,ζ,λ) solves sup(σ0,ζ0,λ0)∈E infHt Wt(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Ht). Now, the equilibrium derived above,
(σr,ζr,λ r), delivers the payoﬀ Wrawls after all histories. Hence, any PRPE (σ,ζ,λ) must deliver a continuation
utilitarian payoﬀ weakly in excess of Wrawls, and so its induced pair (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) has a Rawlsian payoﬀ weakly
59in excess of Wrawls,i . e . Wr(Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) ≥ Wrawls. Combining this inequality with that derived earlier, we
conclude that if (σ,ζ,λ) is politically revision-proof then its induced name distribution-allocation pair satisﬁes
Wr(Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1)=Wrawls and this pair solves the Rawlsian planner’s problem.
Suppose that (Ψ1,{ϕt}∞
t=1) is a payoﬀ stationary pair that solves the Rawlsian problem. Then by an argument
similar to that given above, we can construct a PCE (σ,ζ,λ) that induces this pair. This continuation equilibrium
attains the Rawlsian payoﬀ Wrawls after each history. If this continuation equilibrium is not politically revision
proof, then there exists another pair (σ0,ζ0,λ 0) satisfying minHt Wt(σ0,ζ0,λ 0|Ht) >W rawls + ε,s o m eε>0.B u t
then, using Lemma 7, the distribution-allocation pair induced by this continuation equilibrium is feasible for and
solves the Rawlsian problem with a Rawlsian payoﬀ strictly greater than Wrawls. This is a contradiction. ¥
608A p p e n d i x : P r o o f s
Proof of Proposition 1 By assumption, the constraint functions {Zt◦U +X} map from Γ({Rt},Ψ) t oas u b s e t
of  ∞ with an interior point. Since each Zt is concave and X is concave, {{ϕt}∞
t=1|{Zt ◦ U + X}({ϕt}∞
t=1) ≥ 0}
is convex. Γ({Rt},Ψ) is convex and
R
R γ(w)U({ϕt(w,·)}∞
t=1)Ψ(dw) is concave. Consequently, by Luenberger
Theorem 1, p.217, there is an element μ∗ ∈  0
∞ such that































t=1 attains the supremum in (5), then the Lagrangian on the right hand side of (49) has a saddle point at
μ∗, {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1.T h a t μ∗ can be represented by an element in M follows from Rustichini Corollary 5.6. Thus, the
saddle point condition (8) holds.
The converse follows from Luenberger Theorem 2, p. 221 and Rustichini Corollary, 5.6. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2 For the ﬁrst part, note that if {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (5), then by the previous
proposition, there is a sequence {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L such that {ϕ∗
t}∞















t=1).L e t{b z∗
t}∞




t,·i. By Assumption 2, L∗(·;{μ∗
t}∞
t=1,{b z∗






























































t}),f o rs o m e{μ∗
t} ∈ L and for
{b z∗
t} satisfying (1) in the proposition. If for some {ϕ0
t}∞















It then follows from (2) in the proposition that {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 and {μ∗
t} satisfy the saddle point condition (8) and, hence,
{ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 is optimal in (5). ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 Let {ϕt}∞
t=1 be an allocation in Γ({Rt},Ψ).F i xT ∈ {1,2,...} and for each history θT and
t ∈ {1,...,T},s e tϕ0


























































































































63Fix (w,θT) and let bt =
PT−t+1
r=1 βt+r−1θt+r−1(θT)ϕ0







































































































































πT(θT) Ψ(dw)=0 , using the non-negativity of each zr and the boundedness of
64the allocation functions {ϕt}∞

















































































C(ϕt(w,θt))πt(θt)Ψ(dw)) < ∞, adding
this term to both sides of the previous equality gives the desired result. ¥
Proof of Proposition ?? From the Proposition 2, if {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 attains the supremum in (5), then there is a pair
of sequences {μ∗
t}∞
t=1 ∈ L and {b z∗
t}∞
t=1, b z∗







































65By Assumption 2 and {μ∗
t}∞







t.T h u s , d e ﬁning {z∗
t}















t(w,θt)πt(θt)Ψ(dw). Consider the problem

















































then there exists some allocation {ϕ0
t}∞
t=1 ∈ Γ({R∗





































































t},Ψ) ⊂ Γ({Rt},Ψ), this contradicts the optimality of {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 in (??). Hence, {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 is
optimal in (52). Applying Lemma 1 allows us to rearrange the objective in (52) to obtain the ﬁrst part of the
66result.
For the converse, apply Lemma 1 to obtain the objective in (52). Let













t}). If this inequality is strict, then there
exists some allocation {ϕ0
t}∞
t=1 ∈ Γ({R∗


























































































t},Ψ) , this contradicts the optimality of {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 in (52). Hence, {ϕ∗
t}∞
t=1 is optimal in (??).
Now, apply Proposition 2. ¥
67P r o o fo fL e m m a3 That (σNI,ζNI,λ NI) forms a PCE follows from the argument preceding Lemma 3. It
attains the utilitarian payoﬀ W1(σ,ζ,λ)=E[θ]u(R).
We show now that it is a worst PCE. Let (σ,ζ,λ) denote an arbitrary PCE. Let its payoﬀ begivenbyW1(σ,ζ,λ).
Consider a political party that proposes a no insurance allocation SNI at date 1. This party, if it won the election
,would deliver the utilitarian payoﬀ of: (1−β)E[θ]u(R)+βW2(SNI|σ,ζ,λ). Given Assumption 8, σ satisﬁes (14).
Since SNI need not be the election winning choice prescribed by σ,w eh a v e :W1(σ,ζ,λ) ≥ (1 − β)E[θ]u(R)+
βW2(SNI|σ,ζ,λ). Now consider a candidate who proposes SNI in period 2 after the history SNI.O n c em o r et h i s
proposal need not be that prescribed by σ and so, W2(SNI|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ (1 − β)E[θ]u(R)+βW3(SNI,SNI|σ,ζ,λ).
Similarly, for any period t, we obtain: Wt({SNI}t−1
t=1|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ (1 − β)E[θ]u(R)+βWt+1({SNI}t
t=1|σ,ζ,λ). Com-




the limit in T a n du s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tp a y o ﬀs are bounded: W1(σ,ζ,λ) ≥ E[θ]u(R).Thus, (σNI,ζNI,λ NI) delivers
the lowest utilitarian payoﬀ amongst PCE. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 (Necessity) Let (σ,ζ,λ) be a PCE and Υ(σ,ζ,λ) it’s induced outcome path. Since








=( 1 − β)E[θ]u(R)+βWt+1(Ht,SNI
t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ)
≥ (1 − β)E[θ]u(R)+βWt+1(Ht,SNI
t ,h t|σNI,ζNI,λ NI)=W.
68Here the ﬁrst inequality stems from the fact that σi
t(Ht) solves maxSt(Ht,λ)
R
Ut(Ht,S t,h t|σ,ζ,λ)Qt(dht) and that
SNI
t ∈ St(Ht,λ), the equality follows from the deﬁnition of SNI
t , the second inequality follows from the fact
that (σNI,ζNI,λ NI|Ht,SNI
t ) delivers the lowest utilitarian payoﬀ amongst continuation PCE’s. Consequently,
Υ(σ,ζ,λ) satisﬁes (3) above.
(Suﬃciency) For the converse, we construct a strategy proﬁle that induces Υ = {{HΥ




a n dt h e nv e r i f yt h a ti fΥ satisﬁes (1)-(3) above, then it is an equilibrium strategy proﬁle. For Ht ∈ HΥ
t ,s e t
σt(Ht)=σΥ
t (Ht),f o r(Ht,m t−1) ∈ J Υ
t , λt(Ht,m t−1,w,θ)=λΥ
t (Ht,m t−1,w,θ).F o r Ht / ∈ HΥ
t ,s e tσt(Ht)=
σNI
t (Ht),f o r(Ht,m t−1) / ∈ J Υ
t , λt(Ht,m t−1,w,θ)=λNI




















t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ) <D (Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,ξ,δt). It is straightfor-
ward to verify that these strategies are resource-feasible and optimal for agents. To verify the optimality of the
political strategies note that by (3), for Ht ∈ HΥ








t (Ht),h t|σΥ,λ Υ)QΥ
t (Ht,dh t)




Ut(Ht,S t,h t|σ,ζ,λ)Qt(Ht,dh t).
where the maximality of SNI
t in St(Ht,λ NI) delivers the ﬁnal inequality. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 P r o o f :Let {ST−1+t}∞
t=1 = {MT−1+t,ϕ T−1+t}∞
t=1 denote the outcome sequence of mecha-
nisms induced by the continuation equilibrium (b σ,b ζ,b λ| b HT).L e t {b λT−1+t( b HT,{ST−1+r}t
r=1,h T,θt;mT−1+t)}∞
t=1
denote the equilibrium sequence of distributions over message histories in periods T − 1+t conditional on
69the aggregate history of the game, the agent’s individual history up to T and realized sequence of shocks af-
ter T. We proceed in two steps. First, we replace the original sequence of mechanisms with a new direct
sequence: {S0
T−1+t}∞
t=1 = {Θ,ϕ 0
T−1+t}∞




b λT−1+t( b HT,{ST−1+r}t
r=1,h T,θs;mT−1+t)). Next, we use this sequence to obtain a new mechanism sequence
{S00
t }∞
t=1 = {Θ,ϕ 00
t}∞





T−1+t(hT,θt)Qt( b Ht,b λ|dht).
We now set the policy strategies recursively as follows. For each history Ht,l e tn<tdenote the date of the
last election-winning defection, where n =0if no defection has occurred. Set for each i and t, σi
t(Ht)=S00
t−n.
Thus, the strategy implements the mechanism sequence {S00
t }∞
t=1 and if there has ever been a defection, it begins
implementing this sequence from the beginning. Set λt(Ht+1,h t,θt)=1 θt if there was no defection in period t;









t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ) ≥ δt + ξ
0 if ∆Ut(Ht,SA
t ,SB
t ,h t|σ,ζ,λ) <δ t + ξ
(54)
Given our restriction to symmetric PCE, this is optimal for agents and, as usual, ties the probability of winning
an election to the utilitarian continuation payoﬀ.
Next, we check that the message strategy of agents is optimal. This strategy implies truthtelling if the parties
are adhering to the sequence {S0
t}∞
t=1. Recall that this mechanism sequence is constructed in two steps. In the ﬁrst,
a sequence of continuation mechanisms {Θ,ϕ 0
T−1+t}∞
t=1 is obtained such that if each agent is truthful she obtains
the same expected payoﬀ as she received in the original continuation equilibrium (given her past history (w,mT−1)).
Moreover, any alternative message strategy gives the agent a payoﬀ she could have obtained by deviating from
70b λ in the original continuation equilibrium. Since agents chose not to deviate in this way truth-telling is optimal
for agents when confronted with {Θ,ϕ 0
T−1+t}∞
t=1. In the second step, individual histories (w,mT−1) are integrated
out. Since it is optimal for agents to report truthfully regardless of their past history (w,mT−1) after the ﬁrst
adjustment, it remains optimal for them to do so after this second adjustment. Thus truth-telling is optimal for
agents confronted with the mechanism sequence {S00
t }∞
t=1. If a party defects and wins the election at t,t h ep o l i t i c a l
strategy σ calls for parties to ignore in future periods any messages sent in the present and to resume implementing
{S00
t }∞
t=1. Knowing this it is optimal for agents to send a message that maximizes their current payoﬀ in the period
of a defection. Thus, the message strategy λ is optimal for the agents.
It remains to check that the policy strategy is optimal for the political parties. First, note that along the
equilibrium path (σ,ζ,λ) delivers the same sequence of continuation utilitarian payoﬀs as the original continuation
equilibrium (b σ,b ζ,b λ| b HT) did along its equilibrium path. Moreover, (σ,ζ,λ) uses weakly less resources along its
outcome path than does (b σ,b ζ,b λ| b HT).L e t{rt}∞
t=1 denote the sequence of political rents induced by (σ,ζ,λ) along
its outcome path and let {b rT−1+t}∞
t=1 the sequence induced by (b σ,b ζ,b λ| b Ht) along its outcome path. It follows that
rt ≥ b rT−1+t,e a c ht and the allocation induced by the outcome path of (σ,ζ,λ) is resource-feasible.
Now, consider one step defections by political parties from the outcome path implied by (σ,ζ,λ). Given that 1)
agents report their best current message in the period of a defection and 2) defections result in a resumption of the
mechanism sequence {S00
t }∞
t=1 and of truth-telling in the period after a defection, the best one step defection that a



















71Let b rT−1+t denote the rents obtained by each party at date T − 1+t under (b σ,b ζ,b λ| b Ht). Since, at each date
T − 1+t along the continuation path both parties were better oﬀ implementing the mechanism ST−1+t and
collecting the associated rents if elected, than undertaking a (feasible) deviation to a mechanism of the form














E[θ]u(R − r)+βWT+t(b σ,b ζ,b λ| b HT,{ST−1+s}t−1















W h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a t1 )W ≤ WT+t(b σ,b ζ,b λ| b HT,{ST−1+s}t−1




s=1). Thus, no party has an incentive to make even this best one step deviation. Note that
any sequence of future defections will not aﬀect W
def
t , they will merely lower the party’s payoﬀ in future periods.
Thus, the party has no incentive to defect from {S00
s}∞
s=1. Clearly, the same analysis can be applied to any history
that incorporates a defection (and a resumption of the sequence {S00
s}∞
s=1). We conclude that the strategy proﬁle
is a PCE that delivers W. ¥
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